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FEDERAL RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
ABORIGINAL TITLE: Submerged Lands and Wetlands
In Yankton Sioux Tribe v. South Dakota, 796 F.2d 241 (8th Cir.
1986), the tribe sought to establish its title to the bed of Lake
Andes, which was within the 400,000 acres of land guaranteed to
the tribe by treaty in 1858. After determining that the lake was
navigable at the time of the treaty and at the time of South
Dakota statehood, the district court ruled that the tribe had
aboriginal title to the lake bed.' The district court held that the
tribe, not the state, owned the lake bed.
South Dakota claimed its ownership of the lake bed through
the equal footing doctrine of statehood, i.e., that the purchase of
the Louisiana Territory in 1803 by the United States effectively
held the land in trust for future states. The appeals court found
that although the tribe established possession before South
Dakota's statehood, the possession could not be traced back
earlier than 1810. The court found that the prior U.S. purchase
defeated the tribe's claim to the lake bed. Reversing the district
court, the Eighth Circuit held that when sovereign title is in place
and the operation of the equal footing doctrine begins before any
claim of aboriginal title has ripened, the state's claim of ownership was preeminent.
I Aboriginal title pro'ides original natine. of the United States the exclusz'e right
to occupy the lands and vater, used b their ancostors prior to the United State%' assertion of so.eretgnty over these areas Yankon Sioux Tribe %. Nelson. 521 F. Supp 463.
466 (D.S D. 1981).

CIVIL RIGHTS: Employment
In Dille v. Council of Energy Resource Tribes, 80; F.2d 373 (10th
Cir. 1986), five female former employees of the Council of
Energy Resource Tribes (CERT) filed discrimination charges
against the CERT. The district court dismissed the charges, which
alleged that the CERT had violated Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 by maintaining sex-segregated job classifications. The
CERT consists of a coalition of thirty-nine Indian tribes formed
to collectively manage their energy resources. The district court
found that because Indian tribes were expressly exempted from
Title VII's statutory definition of "employer," the activities of
the CERT were not go, erned by Title VII.
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Title VII clearly exempts a single Indian tribe from the definition of "employer."' Recognizing the principle of construction
that statutes passed for the benefit of Indian tribes should be
liberally construed in favor of the tribes, the Tenth Circuit determined that Congress intended to protect collective efforts by Indian tribes as well as individual Indian tribes. Because the CERT
consisted exclusively of member Indian tribes and because the
organization's decisions were made exclusively by designated
members, the court concluded that the CERT fell directly within
the scope of the Indian tribe exemption of Title VII.
I

42 U S C

4 2000c(b)(1972).

ENTITLEMENT TO FEDERAL BENEFITS
In Zarr v. Barlow, 800 F.2d 1484 (9th Cir. 1986), Diane Zarr, an
enrolled member of the Sherwood Valley Band of Pomo Indians,
applied to the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) for Indian higher
education grants. Her application was denied because, though
Zarr was certified as having 7/32-degree Indian blood, the applicable regulation required at least
-degree Indian blood.'
Seeking an order to compel the BIA to authorize the grant, Zarr
exhausted her administrative remedies and was summarily denied
relief in district court.
Finding that the standard under the administrative regulation
was less inclusive than the statute under which the administrative
standard was promulgated, the Ninth Circuit held that the regulation was in violation of the law. The court analyzed various possible sources of authority for the administration of the ' -degree
Indian blood restriction. First, the court considered whether 25
U.S.C. § 471 conferred authority upon the BIA to distribute
moneys for higher education grants, finding that it did not confer
such authority. 2 However, congressional authority for the grant
program was found in the Snyder Act.'

I 25 C F R
40 1I 96).
2 25 U S.C § 471 (1934) 1.Npart of the Indian Reorganization Act and pro~ides
authori% "'for loans to Indians for the payment of tuition and other expenses in recognized ',ocational and trade schools."
3 rhe Snyder Act proides in part- "The Bureau of Indian Affairs. under the
supervi ion of the Sccretary of the Interior. shall direct. supervise, and expend such
moneys as (ongress may
appropriate, for the benefit, care. and assistance of Indians
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While Zarr could not be included in the Indian Reorganization
Act definition of "Indian,'" 4 she could be included in the definition found in the Indian Financing Act (IFA),' which provides
for the single administration of numerous separate Indian financing programs, including programs under the above-mentioned
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.' For the purpose of the IFA
program, section 1452 of the IFA redefines the term "Indian" to
mean any person who is a member of a federally recognized
tribe.' The legislative history of the IFA was found to support the
conclusion that Congress intended that Zarr should be included
among those persons eligible to participate in programs promulgated under the IFA. Finding that the regulation defeated the
congressional purpose expressed in the IFA, the court held that
the regulation violated the governing legislation.
The BIA argued that 25 U.S.C. § 297 (enacted May 25, 1918)
exemplified congressional use of the
-degree standard for Indian educational assistance and demonstrated the reasonableness
of such a standard. The court rejected this argument on the basis
that (1)section 297 applies only to expenditures in BIA Indian
day schools; (2) section 297 has been repealed and substituted by
an amendment to 25 U.S.C. § 2008(f) (1986), which rejects the
single !'i-degree eligibility restriction; and (3) section 1452 of the
IFA, by failing to expressly provide the Indian blood quantum
factor, impliedly supports the use of the newer, less restrictive
standard found in the IFA. To the extent of any ambiguity between the 1921 Snyder Act, the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act,
the 1974 Indian Financing Act, and the 1985 repeal of section 297
and amendment of section 2008(f), any doubtful or ambiguous
expressions must be resolved in the Indians' favor.'

throughout the United States for the following purposes General support and civilization. incluting edwiation+" 25 U S C. ' 13 (1921) (emphasis added).

4 25 U S C

480 (1939) states: "Gn May 10. 1939. section 480 was added. provid-

ing that loin and alter Miay 10. 1939. no indiidual of less than one-quarter degree of Indian blood shall be eligible for a loan from funds made available in accordance with the
pro'.siosn'

of %ection471

"

25 U S C § 1451-1543 (1974)
6 Section 1462 of the IFA specifically
authorizes loans for educational purposes.
I Section 1452 of the IFA provide,. "For the purpose of thischapter, the
term-(bl 'Indian' means any person who is a member of any Indian iribe . which is

rccognized by the Federal Government as eligible lot sersices from the Bureau of Indian
Affairs "
8 ,arr, xcO F 2d 1484 (9th Cir 198,6). citing Bryan
392 (1976)

Iasca County, 426 US. 373.
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The court further rejected the BIA's argument that Congress
-degree standard based upon its prior appropriaratified the
tions for BIA budget requests, requests which explicitly cited the
'/4-degree standard. Finding that the BIA had failed to sustain
"the heavy burden of demonstrating congressional knowledge of
the precise course of action alleged to have been acquiesced in," 9
the court concluded that the BIA did not establish that Congress
was aware of, much less approved of, the -degree blood quantum.
The court, having determined that the regulation was not
within the scope of authority conferred upon the BIA and not
reasonably related to congressional intent, never reached Zarr's
trust obligation and equal protection arguments. Zarr, under the
circuit court's decision, was granted a remand and a reversal of
the district court's summary judgment.
9. Id. at 1493, quoting Rincon Band of .Mission Indians v. Harris. 618 F2d 569,
571 (9th Cir 1980)

JURISDICTION: Federal Courts
In United States v. Barquin, 799 F.2d 619 (10th Cir. 1986), a

member of the Shoshone-Arapahoe Tribe was indicted in federal
district court under 18 U.S.C. § 666(c), of unlawfully paying
$1,000 to an official of the Northern Arapahoe Business Council
to obtain favorable treatment on the award of a contract for a
reservation project. Section 666(c) imposes criminal sanctions on
a person who offers a bribe to a governmental agent. On appeal,
the defendant entered a conditional plea of nolo contendere,
moving to dismiss the indictment on two grounds: (1)the definitional provisions of section 666(c) exclude Indian tribes as an entity, and (2) section 666(c) is unconstitutionally vague, ambiguous, and overbroad. The defendant's motion was summarily
denied. The sole issue on appeal was whether the person to whom
the defendant's payment was made was an agent of a local
government agency. The defendant contended that a "political
subdivision" connotes a subdivision of a state, and sh.ce an Indian tribe is "a sovereign entity wholly independent of a State,"
Indian tribes and their agencies fall outside the statutory defini-
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tion.' The government contended that because the Arapahoe
Tribe is geographically located within the state of Wyoming, it
was by definition a local government agency.
Because section 666 uses sufficiently exacting terms, the court
felt it could not extraneously analyze the general objectives of
the section. The court had already recognized that because section 666 is punitive, it must be strictly construed. 2 Due to the inherent sovereignty of the tribe, the tribe was found to fit outside
the statutory definition of "local government agency" and was
not a "subdivision" of any entity. The court based this conclusion on its analysis of the tribe's government and the tribal
government's place among the "hierarchy of governments,"
rather than the behavior of the tribal members. The circuit court
indicated that if Congress had intended to include Indian tribes
within the meaning of section 666, it would have done so with
specificity. The case was remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss the indictment.

I 19 U S.C § 666(d)(2). (3) (1986). the definitional %ectionof the statute. pro%ides
go.ernment agency' means a subdivision of the executiv-. legislative, judicial, or other
hran,:b of a zoternin'n
. and 'local' inean%of or pcrta..ng to a pIhttol subdivison
ithm a State
(Etmpha,%s added-)
2 799 F 2d 619 (l0th Cir 1986). citmg l)o.ing
United States. 473 U S 201

SOVEREIGNTY: Licensing and Regulation
In Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 798 F.2d 1324 (0th Cir.
1986), Superior Oil had filed suit in federal district court seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief against the United States,
various federal officials, and the Navajo Tribe, its tribal council,
and tribal officials.' The plaintiffs contended that federal officials, by failing to approve lease assignments, and tribal officials, by denying Superior Oil the right to undertake seismic
operations on the land covered by the lease, intentionall: allowed
the leases to expire. Both actions were alleged to constitute
uniawful confiscation of Superior Oil's property rights.

I

Superir Oil ) o

United State,. 605 I

't',

674 (1) tttah 1985).
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The district court found that approval of assignments and permits was discretionary on the part of the tribal council chairman.
The district court held that it was without jurisdiction to grant
relief against the Navajo Tribe and its official because of the
tribal immunity.
On appeal, the court held that when the issue is whether a
tribal court has exceeded the bounds of its jurisdiction in a case
involving civi! subject matter jurisdiction, the issue is a federal
question and the federal district court is competent to review a
tribal court determination under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. However, the
court believed that the district court should have delayed addressing the issue of tribal sovereign immunity until Superior Oil exhausted its tribal remedies.
If the Navajo Tribe and its officials intentionally and arbitrarily withheld consent to assignments of leases and requests for
seismic permits, the court deemed they may have acted in bad
faith. The court remanded the case with instructions that if the
district court found that the Navajo Tribe and its officials
withheld action on the requests of Superior Oil to harass the
plaintiff or destroy the value of the leases, 28 U.S.C. § 1331
would not require exhaustion of tribal remedies as a prerequisite
to obtaining jurisdiction in federal district court.

TAXATION: Cigarettes
Two Delaware Indian brothers sold untaxed cigarettes and other
tobacco p,-oducts from a smokeshop located on Indian land. In
Brooks v. Nance, 801 F.2d 1237 (10th Cir. 1986), the brothers
brought suit under the Tax Injunctive Act (TIA),' alleging that
their civil rights were violated when Oklahoma state officials
seized for forfeiture the untaxed cigarettes on sale at the
smokeshop. The plaintiffs sought declaratory relief, injunctive
relief, and damages. The tribal court dismissed the case, holding
that section 1341 of the TIA deprived the court of subject matter
jurisdiction. 2 Section 1341 is, in effect, a broad limitation against
the use of federal equity powers regarding state collection of
taxes.

I. 42 U.S C § 1983 (1982)
2 The Tax Injunctive Act provides "The district courts shall not enjoin, suspend
or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law ,.here a plain.

pecdv and efficient remedy may be had in the court- of ,uch State ""
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The Tenth Circuit rejected the three contentions presented by
the appellants. First, appellants contended that their allegation
was a civil rights matter with the state tax liability being an incidental dispute. Thus, the TIA should not bar the court's jurisdiction. The court disagreed, concluding that the prohibition of section 1341 could not be avoided by alleging a civil rights violation.
Second, the Brooks brothers contended that the federal court
had jurisdiction because Oklahoma had no jurisdiction over Indian country. The court determined that it was well established
that the exercise of jurisdiction by state courts over claims by Indians against non-Indians, even when those claims arose in Indian country, "would not interfere with the right of tribal Indians to govern themselves under their own laws."'
Finally, appellants contended that if the TIA was found to be
applicable to this case, the state's action fell under the exception
within the Act. The exception requires that the jurisdictional bar
does not apply unless "a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may
be had in the courts of such State."' The appeals court construed
this exception narrowly. After reviewing the remedies available in
Oklahoma's state court system, the court concluded that for purposes of section 1341, the Oklahoma courts provided an adequate
iemedy to challenge the lawfulness of the state government practices under the Oklahoma Cigarette Tax Act.
In conclusion, the Tenth Circuit noted that the doctrine of
comity provided an additional basis for depriving the federal
courts of jurisdiction. The principle of comity bars federal courts
from granting either injunctive or declaratory relief in state tax
cases.' The principle of comity barred the federal court system
from considering the alleged unconstitutional administration of
the Oklahoma tax system.
3 801 F 2d 1237 1240 (10th Ci
1986). citing Three Affiliated Tribes %.
Eng'g. 467 U S 138. I1481984)
4. 28 U SC - 1341 (1948)
'lcNar>,.
5 801 F 2d at 1241. .mog !-air Ae,\.meni in RealI 1state A vsn

old

454

U S 1W0.116 (1981)

TAXATION: Federal Income
In Dillon v. Unted States, 792 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1986), individual members of the Puyallup Tribe were selling cigarettes on
trust lands exempt from federal income tax. The Internal
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Revenue Service (IRS) assessed federal tax on income from the
cigarette sales and the Tax Court upheld the IRS determinations.
The tribal members claimed they were exempt from payment of
federal income taxes under the Medicine Creek Treaty of 1854,
the General Allotment Act of 1887, and the United States Constitution.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the Medicine Creek Treaty had
not been violated because the income tax was not a burden on a
treaty-protected right; rather, it was on income earned from the
exercise of that right. Considering the General Allotment Act, the
court applied the "derived from the land" standard to rule that
income from cigarette sales was not tax exempt under the Allotment Act. The court also found that taxing cigarette sales,
though not taxing income derived from mining, timber, and
agriculture, was not a violation of the equal protection clause of
the fifth amendment of the Constitution. This rationale was
again based on the "derived directly from" rule.
The tribal members argued that if they were leasing the land,
the income from those leases would be nontaxable. Therefore, at
least the amount of the incom, from cigarette sales transacted on
leased land should be nontaxable. The court rejected the argument, reiterating that any tax exemption would have to be for income "directly derived from" the land and that none of the income from cigarette sales qualified. The appeals court thereby affirmed the decisions of the district court and the Tax Court.

TRIBAL COURTS: Jurisdiction
In United States v. Yakimna Tribal Court, 794 F.2d 1402 (9th Cir.
1986), two Yakima Indian sisters, Viola Sohappy and LaRena
Sohappy Brown, sought to prevent federal officials from
rerouting an irrigation canal crossing their property. The Sohappys initially obtained from the tribal court an order permanently restraining the irrigation project officials and its employees
from entering the Sohappys' land. The United States then filed a
complaint in federal district court against the Yakima Tribal
Court, seeking a declaration that the tribal court's injunction was
void and an injunction restraining any further interference with
the project.
The district court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, rejecting the tribal court's claim that it was im-
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mune from suit. Tribal immunity was held not to operate against
the federal government. In contrast, the fact that the project
engineer was found to be acting within the scope of his official
capacity meant that the federal government's sovereign immunity
barred the action taken by the tribal c6urt. The district court
declared the tribal court's orders void and issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the tribal court from enforcing its order.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. Because the Sohappys had granted the federal government a
right-of-way across their property for irrigation purposes while
the appeal was pending, the appeals court considered the issue of
mootness. Though a settlement had been reached between the
Sohappys and the Interior Department (parties to the tribal court
proceedings), none of the parties to the present appeal (the tribal
court, its chief judge, and the United States) were involved in the
settlement. In addition, the tribal court's order appeared too
broad, restraining the government from entry onto the land for
any purpose.
The district court's conclusion that the tribal court proceedings
were an uncontested suit against the federal government barred
by sovereign immunity was upheld. The circuit court found that
the state officers were acting within the scope of their official
capacities and, therefore, a simple mistake of law or fact by the
official did not override the sovereign immunity of the United
States.'
Also dismissed by the circuit court was appellants' argument
that tribal ,overeign immunity barred the action. The court held
that "the UWited States may sue Indian tribes and override tribal
sovereign immunity." Last, the court rejected the tribal judge's
assertion o. judicial immunity. In the court's view, that defense
does not serve to bar injunctive relief agains! a judicial officer
acting in his judicial capacity.'
'-,hool & Io,p %, Halderman. 465 U.S. 89. 113
cid Pcnnhu.r ,tric
I The court
(ahlorna \"acr R' (ontrol Bd . 674 P 2d 1227.
In.
11984). and Amnoil ti -A
14th (,r- 1982)
123.1
2 794 F 2d at 1.108. cuiniz L ntted ,tx:e' hue Mountain Apache, 784 F.2d 917.
2
Can2r
19a.
1901
'121)
(198-1)
I Id . citing Pullham %. Allen, -166 1 S' 5'22. 5.41-412
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